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Abstract  This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early 
model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The 
tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks:  1) extract model parts from text 
for architecture and safety/hazard models;  2) combine the parts with library information 
to develop the models for visualization and analysis;  3) perform graph analysis on the 
models to identify possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and 
functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations;  4) perform 
discrete-time-based simulation on the models to investigate scenarios where these 
paths may play a role in failures and mishaps;  and 5) identify resulting candidate 
scenarios for software integration testing. This paper describes new challenges in a 
NASA abort system case, and enhancements made to develop the integrated tool set. 
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Problem Statement 
Unsafe system-software interactions are a major concern in software validation and demonstrating 
software safety.1 A unified, systematic, and automated approach is needed to validate system 
requirements and identify failures and hazards that NASA flight software is designed to handle. Early 
evaluation of software requirements and design will reduce system-software integration risks. It is 
important to identify requirements gaps and robustness issues early and often because relevant 
factors in complex controlled systems are easily overlooked. It is also important to assess system 
failures and anomalous conditions that may challenge software in system integration testing. As 
shown in figure 1, operations and stresses in software can ‘activate’ faults and influence failures in the 
controlled system (the “plant”) or the environment. Likewise, operations and stresses in the controlled 
system or the environment can ‘activate’ faults and influence failures in the software. Interacting 
cascades are possible. 
 
Uniform automated methods are needed for extracting early information from requirements 
specifications, for system modeling for validation and safety analysis. Without these methods, quality 
is inconsistent from one project to the next. Probability increases that requirements-induced errors 
and hazards will propagate to subsequent development phases. In addition, excessive amounts of 
time can be consumed in reanalyzing modified or added requirements as projects progress. Semi-
automated information extraction, model generation, and analysis save labor and schedule by using 
data extracted from documents. Automated information extraction can improve the efficiency, 
consistency, repeatability, and comprehensiveness of modeling and analysis, and it can reduce the 
time spent reanalyzing when specifications and designs change. 
 
 
Figure 1. Concept of system-software interactions related to hazards. 
 
Technical Approach 
The goal of the research is to enable early model-based system-software failure and hazard analysis 
during requirements and design phases. The approach is to integrate and enhance previously 
developed prototype tools for text information extraction, system architecture modeling, simulation, 
and analysis. The feasibility of this integrated approach has been demonstrated.2,3 Figure 2 shows a 
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diagram of the relationships among the prototypes in the project. This diagram is taken from the 
Concept of Operations document for the project,4 which provides a functional description of the 
proposed system and its components and defines operational scenarios for tasks supported by the 
system. Products of the system support personnel in the safety and mission assurance (SMA) 
organization. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Component diagram of model-based system-software safety analysis. 
 
Reconciler5 and the Aerospace Ontology6 are used together for semantic analysis and extraction of 
models from requirements and design texts. Parts of abstract physical architecture models are 
extracted to model and analyze the controlled system architecture. Systems, subsystems and 
components and their interfaces are extracted. Operational modes and functions, constraints, 
sensitivities, hazards, and risks are also extracted. 
 
The Hazard Identification Tool (HIT) Modeler module is used to develop system architecture models 
from the extracted model information by using model structures that map to the types of extracted 
information. Libraries of component types are used to fill in missing information with defaults. HIT 
Modeler also provides a visualization for inspecting the architecture implied by the requirements and 
design documents.  
 
The HIT Path Analyzer module7 and the CONFIG hybrid simulator8 are used to analyze hazard paths 
and simulate risk propagation in the system during operational and off-nominal scenarios. CONFIG 
has been used previously for validation testing of intelligent control software for gas storage and 
transfer in a manned life support test. Among other things, deficiencies in the software requirements 
were identified. Analysis and simulation is used to identify possible hazard paths in test scenarios for 
a virtual system integration laboratory (VSIL) for software testing.9 
 
Initial Model Feasibility and Integration Case. The first project case used a portion of a generic 
spacecraft model to evaluate modeling feasibility, using XML formats for communicating model parts 
and models. The HIT Modeler was re-implemented to use CONFIG model building and model display 
capabilities. Figure 3 shows a data connection between two spacecraft subsystems as it was 
extracted, modeled, and visualized. The models of the subsystems or components can also contain 
information on hazards and sensitivities to potential hazards. 
  
 
 
Figure 3. Simple spacecraft architecture model: HIT model output. 
 
NASA Orion Launch Abort System Case. To challenge and extend the technology, a large-
scope space system case has been selected: analysis of system-software interactions and hazards 
for a pad abort test of the Orion spacecraft launch abort system (LAS). NASA will perform a series of 
six abort flight tests at White Sands, New Mexico, starting in the fall of 2008 and ending in 2011. In 
the two pad abort tests, the LAS will be used to safely propel the crew module (CM) boilerplate 
mockup away from the launch pad. The pad abort happens in two stages. First, abort and attitude 
control motors are used to propel the launch abort vehicle (LAV), which is made up of CM and LAS, 
from the Ares launch vehicle or the launch pad, toward a suitable landing area. Second, the LAV 
reorients for landing, the LAS is jettisoned, fuel is dumped, and parachutes are deployed for safe 
reentry and landing of the CM. Software-related test objectives of the first pad abort test include 
demonstrations of telemetry transmission from the CM through the LAS boost protective cover, abort 
events sequencing, parachute and landing sequencing, and functional performance of the ground 
support command, control, and monitoring system. 
 
There are new types of subsystems, functions, and hazards in the LAS domain. The information to be 
extracted is rich, varied, and distributed throughout many requirements and design documents in 
various formats. These include flight test objectives, requirements, failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA), risk analysis, interface requirements documents, and interface control documents. The 
sentence structures in rationales and descriptive introduction sections can be very complex. Much of 
the nomenclature in the LAS domain is NASA-unique.  
 
Reconciler Information Extraction. Reconciler has been used to parse text in aerospace 
database records, including space shuttle problem reporting and corrective action (PRACA) and 
space station reliability block diagrams, in space station documents, and in requirements 
<MODEL name="CSRL Spacecraft" type="SYSTEM-UNIT"> 
    <COMPONENTS> 
      <COMPONENT name="CDHC" type="SYSTEM-UNIT"> 
      </COMPONENT> 
      <COMPONENT name="TELESUB" type="SYSTEM-UNIT"> 
      </COMPONENT> 
    </COMPONENTS> 
    <CONNECTIONS> 
      <CONNECTION> 
        <FROM_DEVICE name="CDHC"> 
        </FROM_DEVICE> 
        <TO_DEVICE name="TELESUB"> 
        </TO_DEVICE> 
        <ENTITY-TRANSFERRED name="DATA"> 
        </ENTITY-TRANSFERRED> 
      </CONNECTION> 
    </CONNECTIONS> 
  </MODEL> 
CDHC
Telesub
Data
CSRL Spacecraft
CDHC: Command and Data Handling Computer 
Telesub: Telemetry subsystem 
specifications in SpecTRM10 and Cradle11 requirements specification tools. For architecture modeling, 
Reconciler should process text to extract several types of information (when available): 1) system-
subsystem-component decomposition relationships; 2) interfaces and connections; 3) functions or 
actions of devices; 4) operational and failure modes of devices; 5) variables and events being 
controlled by the system devices and software; and 6) enablers, disablers, limits, hazards, 
sensitivities, risks and failures, and their controls or mitigations. 
 
A complex sentence from an overview of the Orion launch abort system illustrates the content and the 
challenges. 
 
The LAS consists of a nose cone, a canard section which enables the LAS to reorient the CM 
for parachute deployment following an abort, three propulsive motors (attitude control, jettison, 
and abort), an adapter cone that provides the structural interface to the CM, and a boost 
protective cover (BPC) sized for ascent heating to protect CM thermal protection system (TPS) 
coatings. 
 
An ambitious text processing goal is to build an XML structure expressing an indentured structure like 
the one in figure 4. The structure in figure 4 is a human-generated performance benchmark for 
Reconciler, to measure the amount of model information Reconciler extracts compared to model 
information available in a piece of text. Modules have been added for extracting text from Adobe 
document format and extracting acronyms. To extract some of the structure in figure 4, new parsing 
functionality has been added to extract acronyms, part-of relationships, and functional assignments 
and their rationales. 
 
Aerospace Ontology. This standard nomenclature for hardware, software, and human systems 
defines hierarchies of types of subsystems, functions, entities, hazards, and failures. It provides sets 
of mapping words so that many synonyms are accommodated. The nomenclature and class 
hierarchies in the Aerospace Ontology should reflect the LAS domain to support information extraction 
and modeling, and they should map to the classes and library items that are needed for HIT modeling 
and analysis. Classes and associated vocabulary words have been added to the Aerospace Ontology 
to accommodate LAS things and problems, vulnerabilities, and threats. Some of these additions are 
shown in figure 5. 
Top Level: LAS 
     Function: reorient the CM 
     Agent: LAS 
 Action: reorient 
 Operand: CM  
     Function: control attitude 
     Agent: LAS? 
 Action: control 
 Operand:  ? 
          Variable: attitude 
     Function: jettison 
     Agent: LAS? 
 Action: jettison 
     Function: abort 
     Agent: LAS? 
 Action: abort 
     Function: deploy parachute 
   Agent: LAS? 
 Action: deploy 
 Operand: parachute 
LAS Components  
 Component: Nose cone  
   Component: Canard Section  
          Function: ? 
                 Component Enables Function: LAS: reorient the CM 
           Function Enables Function: LAS?: parachute deployment (following an abort)  
   Component Group: Three propulsive motors 
          Component: attitude control motor 
      Enables Function: LAS?: control attitude  
          Component: jettison motor 
       Enables Function: LAS?: jettison  
          Component: abort motor 
       Enables Function: LAS?: abort  
   Component: An adapter cone 
           Connection 
  Connector: adapter cone 
  From: LAS 
  To: CM 
  Type: Structural 
   Component: Boost protective cover 
          Acronym: Boost protective cover = BPC 
          Design parameter: size  
  Determined by: ascent heating 
          Function: protect CM thermal protection system coatings 
  Agent: Boost protective cover 
  Action: protect 
  Operand: CM thermal protection system coatings  
Other: CM 
   Component: Thermal protection system 
        Acronym: thermal protection system = TPS 
 
Figure 4. Model information manually extracted from a complex LAS overview sentence. 
 
 
 
Entities 
– Entity Flows (for connection classes) 
• Data/Signal: data signal, data, signal, telemetry, video, voice, image, audio, 
command 
• Electrical/Data Noise: electrical noise, EMI, radio frequency interference, RFI, 
static, electromagnetic noise, bleed over… 
• Propellant: hypergolic fuel, hypergolic oxidizer, solid propellant, oxidizer, LOX, 
nitrogen tetroxide, (monomethyl) hydrazine, MMH… 
• Energy/Power: energy, thermal energy, acoustical energy, chemical…  
– Mechanical Energy: hydraulic energy, power, force, load, flow…  
– Radiant Energy: radiant energy, illumination, lighting, light, heat… 
– Electrical Energy: electrical energy, current, alternating current… 
– Subsystems and Equipment 
• Subsystems: Launch Site Operation; Abort Systems; Avionics Subsystems; 
Communications… 
• Fluid Storage; Information Storage; Pyrotechnic Equipment; Electrical 
Equipment (generate, store…), Motors, Control Jets; Seals; Fittings; Joints 
• Instrumentation: Sensors, Controllers, Actuators 
• Safety/Prevention Equipment for Mechanical, Electrical, Software  
– Software Safety/Prevention Equipment: firewall, anti-virus, packet filter, 
proxy server, screening router, access control list… 
 
Problems, Vulnerabilities and Threats (to capability, integrity/reliability, 
 performance timing and quality, or controllability) 
– Action/Functions: Not Robust: vulnerable, sensitive, brittle, not stable... 
– Objects: Vulnerable: Not Robust to Damage/Impairment Source 
– Software Threat: spyware, spam, virus, malware… 
– Software Vulnerability: dangling pointer, format string vulnerability, code injection… 
– Bad Software Structure 
– Missing Software Structure 
  
 Counteractions 
– Maintain (good state): Preserve; Ensure 
– Prevent (bad state): Avoid; Withstand; Decrease Sensitivity; Guard 
– Minimize 
– Rectify (from bad state): Neutralize; Safe: Restore (Substitute, Repair, Renew); 
Rework (redo); Undo; Reset 
 
Figure 5. New classes and nomenclature for the LAS case. 
 
Hazard Identification Tool Modeler and Library. The new version of the HIT modeler uses the 
graphical modeling elements of CONFIG modeling and simulation tool for automatic and manual 
model construction and visualizing the architecture models. HIT models represent objects that are 
system components or things that are processed. Models represent function types for: 1) Placing: 
transporting, transferring, and changing connectedness; 2) Processing objects: transforming (e.g., 
phase change) or changing a parameter; and 3) Processing information: monitoring, controlling, 
communicating, regulating, commanding, assisting, counteracting/mitigating. Models also represent 
influences on functionality and problem types for hazard analysis: 1) Damage and impairment 
sources: burdens/shocks, threats, and material hazards; and 2) Vulnerabilities or lack of robustness in 
functions and objects. 
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The HIT Modeler should provide model classes with attributes that map to the extracted information 
types, to enable semi-automated development of component-connection models with embedded 
hazard information and functions. Some of those attribute structures are shown in figure 6. The HIT 
Modeler should also provide a library of component types for the LAS domain that can be used for 
defaults when the information is not available to be extracted. Default hazards, sensitivities and 
enablers, disablers, or influences on performance can be used to create plant models with embedded 
safety issues, for integration testing. 
 
               Class Structures for Library for Objects, Functions, Influence Relationships, Mitigations 
• Component/Subsystem classes with attributes for: 
– Interfaces and Input/Output Parts/Constituents, Parameters  
– Modes/States (with associated Functions) 
– Problems, Hazards, and Sensitivities 
• Function/Action classes with attributes for: 
– Agents, Operands/Patients, Origins/Destinations, Variables 
– Functional Dependency Relations, associated modes 
– Problems, Hazards, and Sensitivities 
• Influence Class with attributes for: 
– Positive-Negative (signed) relation to influenced variable or problem 
– Importance (degree of worst-case impact) 
– Likelihood (probability of occurrence of factor) 
 
Figure 6. Some new draft domain library classes with types of attributes. 
 
Hazard Identification Tool Path Analyzer. The HIT Path Analyzer is a simple, early form of 
automated hazard analysis that can be refined as more design information becomes available. Figure 
7 shows the output from a demonstration of the HIT Path Analyzer when search is dependent on a 
dynamic configuration in a scenario. Simpler analyses find matching hazard-vulnerability component 
pairs, or they perform static path analysis on connections or dependencies. Analysis data include 
cause-condition-vulnerability paths and cascades (hazards and failure effects), as well as 
effectiveness (severity) scores. Severity scores are computed during graph analysis, based on ratings 
of local effectiveness of hazards, connections, and mitigations. The analysis helps identify scenarios 
for software integration testing. The module should be capable of handling scenarios that address the 
types of LAS problems that interact with the software. 
 
 
Figure 7. Output from path analysis demonstration case. 
 
The Aerospace Ontology class hierarchy has been reorganized for compatibility with basic actions 
and functions that are important for path analysis, as shown in figure 8. 
 
• Place/Arrange 
– Move + EntityOperand + Path 
• Transport + SourcePlace + DestinationPlace 
– Change “Owner” 
• Transfer + EntityOperand + Source + Sink  
• Input/Output + EntityOperand  
– Output: Emit (Active-Output); Release (Passive-Output)  
– Take-In: Input (Active Take-In); Receive (Passive Take-In) 
• Process 
– Transform + EntityOperand + Parameter  
• Phase change, change in composition… 
– Change Position on a Scale + EntityOperand + Parameter 
• Increase 
• Decrease 
• Control 
– Regulate + EntityOperand + Parameter 
 
Figure 8. Action primitives for path analysis. 
 
CONFIG Hybrid Simulator. When HIT has identified potential hazard scenarios, possibly including 
mitigations, CONFIG can be used to analyze them in a time-based numerical simulation that 
accommodates design information that is abstract or approximate. It combines discrete event and 
discrete time simulation technology with a capability to dynamically change configuration and 
underlying models during simulation. CONFIG can provide lightweight analysis of cascades of events 
and of the plausibility and severity of potentially hazardous scenarios. Reuse of CONFIG for software 
validation testing can uncover both traditional software problems and some issues concerning 
software requirements. The most interesting issue in the life support evaluation involved a complex 
interaction between elements of the crew chamber and the plant-growth chamber. It is not likely that 
this type of software problem would have been found during conventional software testing because 
the failure response involved a “surprising” sequence of interactions among multiple devices and 
controllers in the system. This sequence would be difficult to conceive of or emulate in conventional 
software testing. 
 
HIT provides a specification for a CONFIG system model and also provides a hazard scenario to 
CONFIG. CONFIG user interface now provides the basis for implementing HIT models and 
visualizations. Therefore, evolving from HIT models to more detailed CONFIG models is easier than in 
the previous implementation. It will continue to rely on correspondence between component types in 
the HIT and CONFIG libraries. 
 
Calendar Year 2008-2009 Milestones 
Mar 2008: Complete Orion model extraction and analysis case  
Jun 2008: Comparative evaluation of capabilities complete, preliminary methods document 
Sep 2008: Complete first version of integrated tool suite 
Jan 2009: CEV requirements and design data extraction complete  
Mar 2009: HIT modeling and analysis complete 
Jun 2009: CONFIG modeling and analysis complete, test definition complete 
Sep 2009: Complete enhanced version of integrated tool suite 
Dec 2009: Evaluation and documentation complete 
 
Calendar Year 2008 Technical Plans 
Work in 2008 will continue to focus on enhancements to Reconciler, HIT, and the Aerospace Ontology 
for LAS model extraction, development, and analysis. Tasks include identifying and documenting 
methods for performing extraction and analysis, as well as identifying LAS document parts and 
formats that are the best sources of the modeling information. User interface improvements will be 
made for use by SMA personnel. 
The scope and performance of the tools for extraction, model development, and analysis will be 
evaluated: 1) the mix of automated and manual tasks and the manual time and effort required; and 2) 
the relevance and usefulness of the outputs to SMA personnel and to VSIL. Software performance will 
be evaluated: 1) comparison of the amount of model information extracted automatically with the 
amount that could be extracted manually; 2) comparison of the hazards and failures identified by 
graph analysis with those found with standard hazard analysis; and 3) comparison of ease of current 
test generation methods with test generation by graph analysis and simulation. 
There will be a number of new technical challenges. One is extraction of scenarios for graph analysis 
and simulation. Another is use of visualizations and model verification to identify requirements gaps 
and inconsistencies. These visualizations are unique because they combine success and failure 
spaces, and system and operation/event spaces. Another is reuse and versioning of models and 
analysis to evaluate requirements and design changes. New tool capabilities are planned to support 
multiple model versions, check changes, and report results of comparisons. 
Conclusion 
The overall approach permits application of graph analysis and abstract simulation to perform model-
based quick-look investigations of the implications of specifications for safety. Thus, it is useful for 
evaluating completeness and consistency of requirements and risk. Reliability and probability of 
events could be used to enhance these analyses. 
This type of architecture model is unique because it combines success and failure spaces, and 
system and operation/event spaces. In addition to the planned uses, this modeling approach could be 
used to demonstrate and evaluate safety cases. This approach is also promising for validating models 
and analyses of failure paths, FMEAs, and fault trees. 
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